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The classical logical analysis of language, dependent on logical translation and a general 
logical analysis of grammatical connectives in natural language has been shown to be forced 
at best and tenuous at worst. However, more recent research in biology and in formal 
semantics has shown that a more nuanced approach to natural language by means of logic 
may be possible. In this essay, an argument is given for a biologically-inspired formal 
semantics inspired by the abstract tile assembly model for DNA origami. Tilings provide a 
rigorous and flexible middle ground between logic and molecules such as DNA. An argument is 
presented that establishes the possibility of a transitivity of tiling properties between logic, 
biology, and language, allowing for a logical analysis of natural language in terms of formal 
semantics built on tiling models, provided this hypothesis is empirically sound. Some further 
attention is given to the explanatory appeal of such a hypothesis, along with a response to an 
initial objection centred on the unpredictability of emergent properties.  
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Introduction 
A central pedagogic element of any course on logic is that we can ‘translate’ natural language 
into a logical language, and that somehow this clears up any imprecise linguistic notions 
which lead to misunderstandings. For the logical positivists, this was more than mere 
pedagogy: it was a driving force of their philosophy. They believed that logicizing every 
aspect of our lives would lead to knowledge of the world, purified from imprecision, implicit 
premises, and, as Wittgenstein famously said, the ‘[B]ewitchment of our intelligence by 
means of language.’ Such hopes were to be dashed because the very precision of logical 
languages showed they were an entirely different beast than natural languages. Recursive 
definitions, truth-conditional analysis, and an emphasis on truth-functionality aren’t hallmark 
properties of natural languages, but of logical languages. Affixing a certain order of symbols 
to a particular mathematical object doesn’t sound like what we’re talking about when we 
think of constructing a sentence in a natural language. Furthermore, natural languages 
evolve while logical languages are static unless otherwise specified.  
 
While this was seen as a mark against the logicization of language, a middle way may 
be had whereby a logical analysis of language is possible but only when we increase the 
expressivity and nuance of logics so as to parallel the same qualities in natural languages. 
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Headway has been made in this direction by way of modal logics and machine learning, but 
a formal-semantical parallel to natural language would have to be of a complexity over and 
above simple directed graphs and weighted graphs that have become so ubiquitous in 
modal logic and machine learning, respectively. In this paper I will present an argument for 
developing a semantic capture of natural language by way of natural language supervening 
on biology. I will argue that biological matter at the molecular, cellular, tissue, organ, and 
organ-functional levels displays structures similar to that of our formal-semantical 
mathematical objects, and that a close analysis of these structures can help logicians to 
develop more precise ways of modeling natural language through logical languages. The 
core of my argument rests on a transitivity of specific mathematical properties from the 
molecular level to the organ-functional level, and that if this transitivity holds, then a 
biological basis may be had for formal semantics.  
 
1. Motivation  
When one first learns logic, they’re asked to translate a very narrow set of sentences 
into their formal-logical equivalents and vice-versa. One later learns that, no, there is no real 
equivalence between a natural language and a logical language, and that the original 
sentences in the natural language had a semantic content which was already highly precise. 
In some ways, translation is a stepping stone to learning the deeper aspects of proofs, and 
for learning how to reason through and follow mathematical proofs written in natural 
language.  
 
Despite the pedagogic power of translating natural language sentences into logical 
language sentences, the reality is roughly analogous to chemistry where Bohr orbits are 
used to teach students the structure of valence bonds, when in fact Bohr orbits are an 
entirely wrong model and it is in fact atomic orbitals — a quantum phenomenon — that 
better describe the way atoms behave. An illustration of the disconnect between logical and 
natural languages comes from Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein is famous for promoting the 
notion of language games that act as different semantic ‘covers’ of formally identical sets of 
sentences. When it comes to natural language, we can already see a difference between 
natural language and the structure and interpretation of logical languages in the context of 
language games.  
 
Perhaps one of the most decisive illustrations of the disconnect between natural and 
logical language comes from this university, namely from the work of Ray Jennings. In his 
book The Genealogy of Disjunction, Jennings shows how the interpretation of the word ‘or’ 
has changed over time, going from having a spatial meaning, namely ‘outside of’, to the 
strong disjunctive meaning we have in today’s colloquial usage, namely ‘either-or’, which is 
the logical connective XOR.1 In another work of his, The Descent of Logic, Jennings also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jennings, Raymond Earl. The Genealogy of Disjunction, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994. 
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shows how the logical interpretation of natural language results in a linguistic trivialization, 
whereby the multivalent meanings of a sentence and its connectives are reduced to a 
bivalent meaning.2  A simple example might be the usage of the word ‘as long as’, and 
observing how its usage has changed from a durational or temporal one, to a usage where 
we interpret it as a conditional.3  Finding further examples of such disconnects is only a 
matter of our comparing and contrasting the usage of natural and logical language.  
 
This impasse provides us with the opportunity for expanding our variety of formal 
semantical systems. The consequence is that we can enrich the structure of various logical 
models, enhancing our understanding of logic, natural language, and even biology. A logical 
language is simply a set of symbols with a precise order of manipulation, and this order of 
manipulation is affixed to some mathematical object(s), such as sets or graphs. The precision 
and manipulability of the symbols is ensured so long as we can make sure its manipulation 
is non-arbitrary, and having a mathematical structure for these symbols to ‘latch onto’ forms 
the nuts and bolts of formal semantics. Yet, our semantical models are too simple for 
natural languages, so, our springboard for expanding the expressivity of formal logic is this 
question: what would it take to have a formal semantics ‘behave’ in a fashion similar to that 
of natural languages?  
 
2. Linguistic Supervenience Thesis  
The foundation of my argument for enriching formal logic and formal semantics 
depends on a supervenience of language upon biology. Although the extent to which natural 
language is determined strictly by biology continues to be a matter of debate, the least 
controversial thesis needed for my argument is a weak form of biological determinism. To 
elaborate further, the primary tension arising from our assuming biological determinism in 
the strictest sense is that of the social influence of language development in children. 
Nowhere is there a gene that tells us to speak English, French, Mandarin, or Spanish, but 
there are certainly genes that seem to contribute to our linguistic intelligence. Further, 
language development can be delayed or even entirely prevented through lack of social 
interaction, showing that a strict genetic determination of language isn’t a tenable thesis. 
The obvious caveat here is that our social activity is indeed influenced by our genes, but my 
thesis about determinism aims at something more subtle: the influence that the structure 
and composition of our biology have on the expression of natural language.  
 
The reason for believing that our usage of language is influenced or ‘filtered’ by the 
structure and composition of our biology arises from the fact that we, as creatures within a 
physical universe of determinate form, are at least as determinate as the structures of the 
laws of physics.  One can think of this as an externalist, epistemological thesis, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Jennings, Ray. The Descent of Logic. The Laboratory for Logic and Experimental Philosophy. Simon Fraser University, 2015. 59. 
Accessed 9 Sept 2015. 
3 Ibid. 
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something of the sort was originally put forward by Erwin Schrödinger in his lecture What is 
Life? Schrödinger suggested that the reason why we can reason so precisely about 
phenomena is because our cognitive constitution is so precisely formed that it’s inevitable 
we come to precise theses as well.4  In short, our witnessing of higher-order patterns should 
be the result of some very fundamental basis patterns, and we should expect these basis 
patterns to reappear at various orders of scale as is the case with many other complex 
systems displaying emergent phenomena.  
 
For instance, our thoughts and actions — including those related to speech — are 
certainly determined by our atomic, molecular, cellular, etc. compositions. Even though we 
cannot exist as human beings without the laws of physics, we also cannot exist as human 
beings without the particular DNA that we have, the proteins that it codes for, and the cells 
and tissues that make up our cognitive and speech faculties. More generally, it shouldn’t be 
controversial that the very structure of this composition should influence the structure of 
our speech, as well as our thoughts. When looking for a more biologically-inspired formal 
semantics, studying the mathematical properties of our biological composition and its 
structure seems to be the perfect place to start for answering the above question about 
formal semantics and natural languages.  
 
3. Information Theory: The Tertium Quid Allowing for a Parallel Between Logic 
and Biology  
The transitivity argument begins with information theory. Information theory is a 
common language between logic and biology, so it’s the perfect place to begin an argument 
for why properties of structures apparent at the microscopic level to structures are also 
apparent at the meso- or macroscopic level. Information theory concerns itself with the 
study of what signals can be communicated between senders and receivers, and how these 
signals may be ordered and how to quantify said order.  
 
Central to information theory is information entropy, which in simple terms is the 
degree in which a signal can encode a given variety of messages. For instance, sending a 
sequence of 1’s is a signal with very low entropy because very little can be said. Suddenly, by 
adding 0’s and allowing for a variety of combinations of 1’s and 0’s, the entropy can become 
staggeringly high, meaning that a lot can be said in a string of 1’s and 0’s of arbitrary length 
and an arbitrary ordering of 1’s and 0’s. Measuring entropy in terms of isomeric 
combinations and studying isomeric combinations as a matter of decidability is our entry 
point for seeking a biological inspiration to a future formal semantics.  
 
When Erwin Schrödinger first proposed the notion of a molecule of heredity in What 
is Life?, he suggested that the mechanism for heredity should be preserved within a one-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Erwin Schrödinger. What is Life? With Mind and Matter and Autobiographical Sketches. Cambridge University Press, 1992. 13. 
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dimensionally ordered ‘aperiodic’ crystal with a size of roughly 300 angstroms. 5 , 6  By 
‘aperiodic crystal’, Schrödinger meant that it is a structuring of matter exhibiting a complete 
plane tiling with the special property that the same pattern never repeats, which is not the 
case with ordinary crystals. Suggesting that a hereditary molecule must be an aperiodic 
crystal was a unique in- sight at the time—one that few people outside of a small circle of 
physicists and information theorists could appreciate. An aperiodic crystal allows for a very 
high informational entropy with very few isomeric elements; in layman’s terms, this lets one 
say a lot with very few words.7  Although DNA has since been discovered to not be 
crystalline, it still has an aperiodic structure exhibiting exactly the same informational 
properties of quasicrystals.8 
  
There are two ways that this can already be related to formal semantics. The first 
way, which I call the ‘easy’ way, is that DNA, genes, and genetic combinations may already be 
studied in terms of higher-order logics. It turns out that quantifying over sets and sets of sets 
allows for computers to discover regularities and correlations between various genes by 
brute force. This is still in the realm of standard formal semantical models of set theory and 
higher-order logics. The second way, which I call the ‘hard’ way — and the one I want to build 
on in this paper — is that the rules of self-assembly and isomeric combination (that are so 
often studied in genetics and bioinformatics) already have a very general relationship to 
contemporary formal semantics, and that teasing out the details of this relationship can help 
us to better understand genetics, logic, and also natural language.9,10 
 
3.1 The Downward Transitivity Argument  
The first step of such an endeavour is to establish a common ground between logic 
and biology, and already we have seen that this basis may be had with higher-order logics, 
but the easy objection may be made here about such a basis, namely that it seems to be too 
‘forced’ of a common ground. However, there are mathematical structures with degrees of 
similarity at various levels of abstraction, and which are present in both genes and organic 
tissues, as well as logics. Logical ‘models’ of formal languages such as modal logics, for 
instance, may be expressed graph-theoretically. The analysis of such models according to 
Kripke semantics involves the building-up of a series of directed edges and vertices whereby 
the validation of a well-formed string of symbols depends on the structure of the graphs at 
hand and the assignment of said strings of symbols to given vertices. One can already study 
such a logical language in terms of isomeric elements and combination rules in the same 
way we can study anything else with such combinatory properties.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ibid., 60. 
6 Ibid., 30. 
7 René Doursat, Hiroki Sayama, and Olivier Michel, eds. Morphogenetic Engineering: Toward Programmable Complex Systems. 
Springer, 2012. 160-1. 
8 Gunther S. Stent. "The Aperiodic Crystal of Heredity." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 758.1, (1995): 28-9. 
9 Christoph Adami. "Information Theory in Molecular Biology." Physics of Life Reviews 1.1 (2004): 7-8. 
10 Werner Ebeling and Miguel A. Jiménez-Montaño. "On Grammars, Complexity, and Information Measures of Biological 
Macromolecules." Mathematical Biosciences, 52.1 (1980): 61. 
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We can now tease out a similarity between graphs and crystals: if we fix the graph’s 
structure to that of a planar graph, and assign rules to the building-up of such a graph, we 
can already develop graphs that can completely tile a plane exactly like a crystal, both 
periodic and aperiodic.11  Indeed, a study of this has already been done in terms of the 
decidability of Wang tilings, which allow for an aperiodic tiling following a rather 
uninteresting planar structure. 12   What makes Wang tilings so interesting is that the 
colourabiltiy of the tiling determines the rules of assembly, allowing us to ask questions 
about the rules of assembly, such as whether they are decidable or not. In fact, Wang tilings 
and tiling games in general are already used to study the decidability, satisfiability, validity, 
etc. of various sorts of logics, such as modal, propositional, and first-order logics.13  
 
My thesis here is that we already have a basis to study DNA and logic with the same 
tools, namely tilings and, more generally, rules of self-assembly of isomeric elements. My 
point here is that there are very likely fragments of already-existing logics buried in the rules 
of self-assembly of biological structures like DNA, RNA, proteins, cells, etc. One question that 
might be asked is whether or not the iterative growth of a semantic tree can parallel iterative 
growth and self- assembly of proteins into cells and beyond. The answering of this question 
might shed light on exactly what fragments of logical languages may best represent 
biological behaviour on the meso and macro levels, and whether or not this should bear any 
similarity to the study of natural language as a matter of biological behaviour.  
 
That such a similarity exists between certain formal semantical models and that this 
similarity can be established, even as a possibility, is a weak-enough starting point for a 
biologically- inspired formal semantics. The way that such a relationship is established is 
through a colloquial homology between patterns found in logic and patterns found in 
nature. The fact that this exists is enough to show that some properties of logics may also 
carry over into properties in nature, and vice-versa.  
 
3.2 The Upward Transitivity Argument  
Now that a relationship between logic and biology is established by appeal to facts, 
the next relationship to be established is one between biology at the micro-level, to biology 
at the meso- level and, as a consequence, to natural language. By natural language here we 
mean language insofar as it is an expression of the structural sophistication of our biological 
apparatus. By relating logic to biology, and biology to language, we have the means to 
establishing at the very least a possibility of there being a relationship between very specific 
logical models and the way in which natural language is expressed. If such a relationship is 
established, a way to modelling natural language and studying it via formal semantics is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Jonathan L. Gross and Jay Yellen, eds. Handbook of Graph Theory. CRC Press, 2004. 1352. 
12 Taati Siamak. “Wang Tiles.” Siamak Taati, 2006. Accessed 30 March 2017. <http://www.math.ubc.ca/ staati/articles/tilings06.pdf> 
13 Bogdan S. Chlebus. Chlebus, Bogdan S. “Domino-Tiling Games." Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 32, no. 3, (1986): 
386-390, Accessed 15 March 2017, doi:10.1016/0022-0000(86)90036-X. 
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open again, over and above merely forcing natural language to fit the requirements of a 
logical language. Since there are no direct examples of such a relationship as of yet, the 
transitivity requirement will depend on a proof of concept that this relationship is at the very 
least possible.  
 
If this seems reminiscent of a universal grammar, it certainly is, but only on the 
surface. Chomsky and Pinker had suggested that, at least in principle, grammar and other 
pattern- forming processes are external to one’s own learned natural language(s) rather 
than being inherent within the language(s) that one learns. This is to say that a linguistic 
animal is not entirely responsible for its linguistic capacities insofar as it is socially 
conditioned to speak a specific language, but rather that there is some other process 
responsible for the animal’s linguisticity. What Chomsky, Pinker, and others don’t consider is 
that the structural ‘kernel’ of such pattern- forming processes shouldn’t have a reason to 
generate speech that is inherently grammatical, but only something patterned. It may very 
well be that we, as linguistic creatures, simply take a pattern and, given the associations we 
make with it, call it ‘grammatical’ and then search for a grammar-like structure. Grammar 
and syntax may very well be just resultant patterns supervening on more fundamental ones.  
 
To see how this may happen, we can think of any chain of iterations produced 
according to a series or some recursive algorithm: one iteration becomes the input of the 
next iteration, etc. In biology, we can think of macromolecules as acting like ‘functions’, 
taking smaller molecules as inputs and rearranging them into proteins, other molecules, and 
waste products. Genes kick off this iteration process by having some genetic code copied, 
and then this is used to form the basis pattern for proteins. Proteins carry on this iterative 
process by coalescing to form larger and more complex structures, the latter of which, in 
turn, organize themselves into higher- order structures. Humans, as linguistic animals, are 
an inevitable result of such a process given sufficient genetic material.  
 
The existing models for studying DNA molecules happen to be tiling models, such as 
the ‘abstract tile assembly model’ (aTAM), using aperiodic tilings such as the Robinson tiling. 
The aTAM is used to study the way in which base pairs interact, and is even used to study the 
information-theoretic properties of DNA. One such usage of the aTAM is for studying ‘DNA 
origami’, whereby DNA folds and organizes into complex structures.14  The aTAM, as an 
aperiodic tiling model with rules of assembly (that is, rules of substitution, etc.) happens to 
model DNA origami with impressive accuracy and predictive power. The question, then, is if 
such a tiling model may be adapted to higher-order organic structures, such as proteins, 
tissues, organs, and even to the behaviours of creatures like human beings and the societies 
they form.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Jennifer E. Padilla, Wenyan Liu, and Nadrian C. Seeman. "Hierarchical Self Assembly of Patterns from the Robinson Tilings: DNA 
Tile Design in an Enhanced Tile Assembly Model." Natural Computing, vol. 11, no. 2, 2012, (2011): 331-5, doi:10.1007/s11047-011-
9268-7 
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Most certainly, the aTAM is insufficient for describing protein folding and tissue 
formation as it stands, since the aTAM is specifically designed with DNA in mind. However, 
the phenomenon of aperiodicity continually recurs in higher levels of scale. One such 
explanation by a group of scientists led by Sharon Glotzer is that quasicrystalline structures 
are a very common consequence of simple thermodynamical properties, and that this, on its 
own, is sufficient to show that physical structures self-organize into quasicrystalline 
structures, if not for any other reason than simply maximizing thermodynamic entropy.15,16  
In other words, maximizing thermodynamic entropy means maximizing information 
entropy. The consequence of this for DNA and proteins is actually quite simple: we should  
expect there to be further aperiodic structures (proteins) formed from lower-order aperiodic 
structures (like DNA), if for no other reason than humble thermodynamics. For the purposes 
of this essay, this consequence fits neatly with what has been conjectured so far, namely 
that at higher orders of scale in biological creatures, we should expect further self-assembly 
rules and more variegated aperiodic structures. The possibility of language being such a 
phenomenon isn’t so dim after all.  
 
One response that may be had would be to say that the self-assembly rules of tilings 
are already implicit in logical languages and that such an algorithm may be extended to 
context- free grammars as well, making the novelty of self-assembly a moot point because it 
can be subsumed by the application of recursive definitions. However, there actually is a 
difference between recursive definitions and self-assembly rules in that self-assembly rules 
present a far stronger structure while recursive definitions in the general case do not de 
facto guarantee a deductive framework strong enough for self-assembly rules in tilings. 
Another response would be to say that a tile assembly model is less abstract insofar as it 
concerns geometric properties directly inherent in a number of material objects, while 
recursive definitions don’t carry the same concreteness. Furthermore, one may go from a set 
of self-assembly rules to logic just as easily as one may go from logic to self-assembly rules. 
Taken together, these responses amount to a counter-argument that self-assembly rules 
seem much more amenable to a material grounding and a much better biological account of 
logic and context-free grammar than the other way around.  
 
One caveat is that I cannot specify what such a tile assembly model should look like, 
but on noting the extent of intimate connection between tile assembly models and formal 
semantics, we should expect there to be some fragment of a first- or higher-order logic that 
can approximate such a model. For all intents and purposes, if we are to look at what can 
more accurately describe natural language, a logical fragment based off of such an assembly 
model would have a better chance of success for studying the logical properties of natural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Peter Palffy-Muhoray, et al. “Disordered, Quasicrystalline and Crystalline Phases of Densely Packed Tetra- hedra." Nature, vol. 
462, no. 7274, (2009): 774-6, doi:10.1038/nature08641. 
16 Pablo F. Damasceno, et al. “Predictive Self-Assembly of Polyhedra into Complex Structures.? Science 337, 453 (2012): 453. 
Accessed 30 March 2017. doi: 10.1126/science.1220869. 
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languages than, say, just FOL plain and simple. This might even help us to identify certain 
truth-functions that better match up to their connective analogues in natural language, and 
ones that may even allow for change over time. We are, of course, by no means modelling 
language exactly when we attempt any of this, but at least we have more to say after we 
have shed the naïveté of a classical logical analysis of language.  
 
The immediate consequences of this line of thought are that language is not only a 
result of genetics, but that the ‘grooves’ upon which languages operate are not inherent in 
the language as a social phenomenon, but rather they are inherent within the structure that 
the language faculty happens to supervene on. We are not linguistic creatures in the sense 
that language floats freely from our physical makeup. Rather, we are primarily creatures of 
patterns, and we receive these patterns from our genes and our environment. One may 
think of the language faculty through an evolutionary perspective in that a natural language 
exapts patterns present in our physical makeup and our environment, and that a significant 
portion of the basis patterns we’ve come to use in language come from the self-assembly 
rules present in genetics and microbiology.  
 
4. Initial Criticism  
There is one significant initial criticism to be made against the current conjecture, 
namely: why should there be a property that re-emerges across various levels of scale? 
Furthermore, why should the given property — no matter how generally construed — follow 
a structure affirming sufficient material and qualitative similarity? I will admit that here the 
rules of self- organization for one level may not be the same for the next. However, the 
kicker here is that emergent properties such as these often display scale invariance, and 
they can also emerge at higher scales. There is a lot of contingency to be had here that can 
only be deferred to empirical investigation. Regardless of whether the transitivity argument 
is right or not, this is still an open avenue for investigation and for potential formal-
semantical research.  
 
5. Explanatory Appeal  
In seeking a mathematical analysis of language, particularly one according to a 
logical fragment inspired by tiling rules, there are four examples of explanatory appeal that 
may be had. The first is that the thesis of tiling rules influencing linguisticity happens to give 
us a way to get a sort of ‘universal grammar’, but without presupposing any particular 
grammar. The second is that the increasing symmetry and self-organization of structures so 
as to form a tiling accounts for a tendency towards symmetry, and upon accepting this tiling-
linguisticity thesis, we have a way to account for the case of a lexical-to-grammatical shift 
seen in the development of human vocabulary. The third is that the global ordering of tiles 
influences the local ordering of tiles, meaning that such a logical analysis of language gives 
us a more mechanical means of studying the holistic qualities of natural language. The 
fourth example is that such a thesis in the most general case explains the behaviour of 
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creatures such as slime molds that display logical behaviour, namely how a certain slime 
mold, Physarum polycephalum, happens to be an excellent natural computational device for 
polyadic logics.17  
 
With regards to the universal grammar hypothesis, a tile assembly-inspired 
explanation can account for recursive and other structural regularities in natural languages 
without positing a specific language gene. There are, for instance, genes that contribute to 
linguisticity such as FOXP2, as well as other genes partly responsible for linguistic 
intelligence.18 However, to say that there is a gene somewhere specifying our grammatical 
structure is to attribute too much to genomes. The fast response has been that, no, such 
grammatical structure is more of a social phenomenon, but the path remains open for a 
partial biological explanation in tandem with a social one. In this case, language, insofar as it 
is a behavioural phenomenon arising from the ordering of tissues, which are in turn ordered 
by proteins and DNA, would be a phenomenon akin to self-assembly rules. In this case, it 
would just be that language does not concern the self-assembly of anything as concrete as 
proteins, but rather the emergence and self-assembly of vocabulary. Universal grammar, 
under this hypothesis, is a result of repetition of local and highly ordered patterns, 
interspersed within more irregular ones. These patterns have their source in biology, and do 
not need an appeal to standalone linguistic explanations. The origin of grammar would then 
be accounted for in more fundamental patterns embedded in our biology that shape our 
behaviour, and not some standalone universal grammar.  
 
This hypothesis also gives us the ability to account for the transition from a lexical to 
a grammatical vocabulary, and the differences between a grammatical and a lexical 
vocabulary. Nicholas Rescher once suggested that in nature there is a force of ‘symmetry 
tropism’ — that is, a tendency towards greater symmetry.19  Such asymmetry tropism might 
beat work in the case of a mechanical explanation for a transition from a more lexically-
dominant to a more grammatically- dominant vocabulary. For instance, the thermodynamic 
hypothesis discussed in the transitivity argument gives a basis for re-imagining language as a 
thermodynamic phenomenon—one that self-organizes into patterns that maximize 
information entropy. In crystals and tilings, we might think of this as a phase change from an 
irregular pattern to a regular but dynamically ordered pattern. Crystal-formation is indeed a 
tendency towards symmetry.  
 
With regards to the holistic qualities of natural language, there is also a certain 
holism to aperiodic tilings and their assembly rules. Roger Penrose suggests that aperiodic 
tilings have a ‘global’ order in that the chance of a local arrangement of tiles affects the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 "Computing with slime: Logical circuits built using living slime molds." ScienceDaily, Elsevier. 27 March 2014. Accessed 30 
March 2017. <www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/03/140327100335.htm>. 
18 Gary F. Marcus, and Simon E. Fisher. "FOXP2 in Focus: What can Genes Tell Us About Speech and Lan- guage?." Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 7.6 (2003): 261. Accessed 5 Nov 2015. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00104-9. 
19 Nicholas Rescher. Nature and Understanding: The Metaphysics and Method of Science. Oxford University Press, 2003. 73. 
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global ordering of tiles and vice-versa. This is to say that if I were to remove a certain tile and 
rotate it another way and still insist that I preserve the aperiodic structure, then I will have to 
either move the tile back to its original orientation or rearrange the entire tiling so as to fit 
the new orientation and placement of the tile I moved. In this way, tilings can experience 
phase changes whereby a local change can result in a global change. Aperiodic tilings can 
undergo phase changes, and so one can transform one tiling pattern into another while 
preserving the structural similarities between one phase and the other—the assembly rules 
remain the same, but can encode a great variety of information in this way. Such tilings can 
have a ‘holistic’ nature in that they cannot be thought of merely as assemblies of discrete 
parts, but also have to be thought of as parts whose order is influenced by the way they fit 
into a larger pattern. The above insights are very useful for describing natural languages in 
that changes in words and interpretations have affinity to global and local phase changes, 
and the understanding of a word cannot be had in the word alone, but only in the context of 
the rest of the language as it is understood by a person.  
 
Finally, a more general version of this tiling-language hypothesis can be had, namely 
that behaviour in organisms should exhibit behaviour akin to that of self-assembly rules in 
tilings, can account for the unusual behaviour of a certain slime mold known as Physarum 
polycephalum.20 This mold can be arranged in such a way as to have it perform logical 
computations, and thus serve as the basis for a truly biological computer, capable of 
performing computations for plane tessellations, logical calculi, etc.21 If the slime mold’s 
metabolism or feeding behaviour exhibit patterns akin to these tile assembly rules, and if 
such assembly rules are sufficient for being combined in sequence to produce a more 
broader scale of computations, then we have an explanatory basis for why such organisms 
display this behaviour.  
 
 
6. Conclusion  
What has been established here is the possibility of a transitivity of specific 
properties between logic, biology, and language. This has been argued for in terms of the 
‘downwards’ and an ‘upwards’ transitivity argument. The former establishes a connection 
between logic and DNA in terms of the mutual uses of tilings for studying logical fragments 
as well as self-organizing patterns in DNA; the latter establishes a connection between DNA 
and language in terms of the abstract tile assembly model, by way of thermodynamical 
considerations. This connection gives us a starting point for examining how we can better 
analyze natural languages in terms of a logical language, specifically a logical fragment with a 
formal-semantical basis in terms of self- assembly rules for tilings. The main hurdle that this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Adamatzky, Andrew, Theresa Schubert, “Slime mold microfluidic logical gates”, Materials Today, Volume 17, Issue 2, March 
2014: 86-91. Accessed 30 March 2017. doi: 10.1016/j.mattod.2014.01.018. 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S136970211400025X>. 
21 “Slime Mould Computers: Prototypes, Models, Algorithms and Applications? ECAL 2015. Accessed 30 March, 2017. 
<https://www.cs.york.ac.uk/nature/ecal2015/slime.html> 
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hypothesis needs to clear is an empirical one, demonstrating that emergence of phenomena 
across various levels of scale are relatively constant and that the tile assembly structure is 
largely preserved. Finally, the explanatory appeal to this hypothesis is that a number of 
disparate phenomena — such as the emergence of language, the holistic structure of 
language, and even the distinctly logical behaviour of other creatures — may be explained 
using one general hypothesis, giving this explanation an advantage by way of parsimony and 
plenitude. It is hoped that all of these above considerations should be at least a tentative 
way forward to a new and biological inspiration for formal semantics.  
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